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This paper considers the optimal regulation of extraction of a common resource by mul-
tiple extractors under conditions of asymmetric information between the regulator and the
extractors and costly monitoring of extraction. Extractors are assumed to use the extracted
resource for productive purposes. A classical example is the problem of optimal groundwater
extraction by a group of nonidentical farmers with di¤ering use values, which is the source
of the asymmetric information between the regulator and the extractor, for the extracted
groundwater. One might think intuitively that such problems of asymmetric information
may be circumvented rather easily by simply requiring each farmer to pay the marginal
social cost of extraction for each unit of groundwater extracted if the marginal social cost
of extraction is identical across …rms. This, of course, is the standard Pigouvian solution.
However, the literature on implementation of the standard Pigouvian solution typically as-
sumes that the ability to monitor extraction is costless. If nonnegligible costs of monitoring
extraction are present, then it will generally be optimal for the regulator not to monitor
completely and instead to monitor on a probabilistic basis. Monitoring on a probabilistic
basis, however, turns the regulator’s problem into a compliance game where the extractor’s
bene…t from noncompliance is dependent upon its own use value of the extracted resource.
If this use value is private information, then the presence of costly monitoring re-introduces
problems of adverse selection which must be addressed.
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1Most analyses of optimal groundwater regulation (Burt and Provencher; Negri) take
an explicitly dynamic approach. For purposes of tractability, however, this approach is
static. Thus, my results are most appropriately interpreted in terms of optimal steady-state
regulation and not in terms of dynamic adjustment paths. The reason for adopting a static
approach does not re‡ect a belief on my part that issues of dynamics are secondary. Indeed,
I would argue that they are of primary importance. However, a number of excellent studies
that focus on these issues already exist, while to my knowledge no studies have addressed
the informational problems that I consider. Thus, this analysis is perhaps best viewed as a
precis of the type of issues that should be addressed in a more complex informational and
dynamic setting.
In what follows, I …rst outline our model. The modelling framework draws on the re-
cent work of Bontems and Bourgeon. I then consider the optimal regulation of groundwater
extraction assuming that the regulator’s objective is social surplus from groundwater extrac-
tion. After that, however, I consider optimal regulation of groundwater extraction that is
further constrained by the government having minimum-income objectives for farmers. The
paper then concludes.
The model
Consider a group ofN farms exploiting acommon groundwater resource. Denote by Bi(q;q¡i)
the bene…t of farm i using a quantity q of the groundwater when the N ¡ 1 others are ex-
tracting q¡i ´ (qj)j6=i. Assume that
Bi(q;q¡i) = ¼i(q) ¡ dQ¡i
where ¼i(q) is the pro…t farm i would obtain with an amount q of the groundwater resource
if no other farm exploits this groundwater resource and dQ¡i the supplementary cost due
to the extraction of the quantity Q¡i ´
P
j6=i qj by the N ¡ 1 other farms. I suppose
that unless the resource allocation is nil, in which case ¼i(0) = 0 for all i, these farms
are heterogeneous in the sense that they obtain di¤erent gross bene…ts ¼i from the same
amount of the groundwater resource. More speci…cally, the productivity of farm i depends
2on its productivity level µi according to the relation ¼i(q) = ¼(q;µi). This productivity level
is the private information of each farm (the type of farm i). The government knows the
distribution of productivity levels, denoted by p(µ) with
P
µ p(µ) = N, but it cannot identify
a farm’s type without prohibitively costly monitoring of the purposes activities. I restrict
attention to the case where farms are of two types only, i.e., µi 2 £ = fµ;¹ µg with µ < ¹ µ and
I assume that farms are ranked according to their marginal productivity of groundwater.
More speci…cally, denoting by ¢(q) the di¤erence of gross bene…ts from a resource allocation




¡ ¼(q;µ), I assume that1
¢
0(q) > 0: (1)
If the regulator knew the private information of each farm of the sector and could costlessly
monitor extraction of groundwater, she would implement the …rst-best assignment rule qFB
i ,
i.e., the production levels that maximize the social welfare given by




where ¡sQ is the social damage corresponding to a total extraction Q ´
P
i qi of the





i ) = s + (N ¡ 1)d
for all i = 1;:::;N. These levels are equivalent to assigning to each farm i one of the two
di¤erent levels qFB(µ) or qFB(¹ µ) given by
@q¼(q
FB(µ);µ) = s + (N ¡ 1)d
for µ 2 £, where @x denotes the partial derivative with respect to x. The …rst-best as-
signment of farm i is di¤erent from its private choice, given by ¼0
i(q¤
i) = 0 or equivalently
@q¼(q¤(µi);µi) = 0, which yields the sel…sh gross pro…t level ¼¤(µi) ´ ¼(q¤(µi);µi).
In the presence of asymmetric information, it is doubtful that the regulator is able to
implement a given quantity assignment without resorting to a reward and/or threat system,
that I assume to be monetary (a tax-subsidy and/or …ne system). Absent redistributional
and …scal concerns, it would be possible to implement the …rst-best allocation via a Pigouvian
3tax (or subsidy) with constant marginal rate equal to the marginal damage s + (N ¡ 1)d,
assuming the agency is able to control without cost the amount of groundwater resource
extracted by each farm.
No farm would willingly comply, however, with such a rule if they are not controlled
by the regulator. Hence, every tax or subsidy scheme must be augmented by a monitoring
system. A public policy is thus a scheme, a (non-linear) relationship between quantities q,
monetary amounts t and f, and a probability of control or monitoring ¹, where q is the
amounts of groundwater resource that the farm can extract, t is a tax or licence fee paid
by the farm for this amount and f the …ne paid in case of a monitoring revealing that an
e¤ective level of groundwater resource y greater than the one permitted q.2
In designing such a scheme, it is easier to consider the “game-form” of the regulation
problem. Indeed, this problem is mathematically equivalent to the problem of having to
design an “announcement game” or “mechanism” where the farms truthfully announce their
private information to the regulator. To obtain truthful announcements, however, the regu-
lator must be able to commit to an assignment rule q(µ), payment rules t(µ) and f(y;µ), and
monitoring probability ¹(µ) (0 ￿ ¹(µ) ￿ 1) that satisfy incentive compatibility constraints
given by
Bi(q(µi);q¡i) ¡ t(µi) ¡ ¹(µi)f(q(µi);µi) ¸ max
y;~ µ
Bi(y;q¡i) ¡ t(~ µ) ¡ ¹(~ µ)f(y;~ µ) (IC)
for all µi 2 £.3 Constraints (IC) require that a type-µi farm is never worse-o¤ announcing
truthfully its type and following the policy requirements than choosing any other announce-
ment ~ µ and production level y. Because the cost dQ¡i due to the extraction of the other
farms does not change the incentive constraint of the farm i, it can be removed from each
side of (IC). The incentive constraints can be thus expressed equivalently in term of gross
pro…ts.
With a control that reveals only the e¤ective amount y and not the farm’s type µ, two
types of misbehavior are possible: The farm may choose to ‘mimic’ another farm’s type, or it
may try to ‘evade’ the policy by not complying with its intended allocation. The …rst type of
cheating is the standard adverse-selection problem investigated in the regulation literature
(Guesnerie and La¤ont). The evasion problem was …rst investigated by Becker and then
4developed by Towsend, Mookherjee and Png and Chandler and Wilde. In the following, we
assume that …nes are constrained by
¹ F ¸ f(y;µ) ¸ 0
where ¹ F, for example, may corresponds to the limited liability of farms. It is common in the
taxation literature to assume that the maximum …ne can be farm-speci…c (e.g., Chandler
and Wilde). However, because monitoring does not permit the regulator to assess the farm’s
pro…t in case of evasion, the maximum …ne cannot be farm-speci…c.
By the incentive constraints (IC), one must have for all µ;f(q(µ);µ) = 0 and f(y;µ) = ¹ F
for all y 6= q(µ). Indeed, for any payment schedule t(¢), setting the …ne to 0 in case of
compliance increases the left-hand side of (IC), while imposing the maximum …ne in case
of evasion at least weakly decreases the right-hand side of (IC).4 This very simple …ne
schedule allows us to separate the two incentive problems of the administration. Let U(µ) ´
¼(q(µ);µ)¡t(µ) denote the gross pro…t of a compliant type-µ farm. The ine¢cient mimicking
problem is addressed by the usual adverse-selection constraints
U(µ) ¸ max
~ µ
¼(q(~ µ);µ) ¡ t(~ µ); (3)
which require that regulation must be designed so that mimicking behavior cannot improve




ft(~ µ) + ¹(~ µ) ¹ Fg (4)
which states that a farm is worse o¤ being sel…sh while declaring to be of a type that
minimizes its expected payment (…ne in case of control included) than by complying with
the groundwater regulation.
Simple manipulations of (3) give
¢(q(¹ µ)) ¸ U(¹ µ) ¡ U(µ) ¸ ¢(q(µ)) (ASC)
implying






By this last expression and (1), it follows that the only incentive compatible contracts




Denote by K ´ min~ µft(~ µ) + ¹(~ µ) ¹ Fg. The constraints (4) can be written equivalently as
K ¸ ¼
¤(µ) ¡ U(µ)
for all µ. Using the …rst inequality of (ASC), we have
¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ U(¹ µ) ¡ (¼
¤(µ) ¡ U(µ)) ¸ ¡¢(q(¹ µ)) ¡ (¼
¤(µ) ¡ ¼
¤(¹ µ))
¸ ¡¢(q(¹ µ)) ¡ (¼(q







The second inequality comes from the fact that ¼¤(µ) ¸ ¼(q;µ) for all q: Under the reason-
able assumption that the regulator never wants to implement a level of extraction by the
¹ µ-type farmer that is higher than what he or she would extract privately, i.e., q¤(¹ µ) ¸ q(¹ µ),
this last expression is positive. It then follows that deterring the ¹ µ-type farmer from evading
the allocation regulation is also su¢cient to deter the less productive from evasion. Math-
ematically, this observation implies that a single constraint is required to ensure that the
contracts deter evasion:
K ¸ ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ U(¹ µ) (EC)
Finally, by the de…nitions of K and U(µ),
K ￿ t(µ) + ¹(µ) ¹ F
= ¼(q(µ);µ) ¡ U(µ) + ¹(µ) ¹ F
which implies that the inspection e¤ort is bounded below by
¹(µ) ¸ (U(µ) ¡ ¼(q(µ);µ) + K)= ¹ F ¸ 0 (CTR)
6where the last inequality comes from (4), using ¼¤(µ) ¸ ¼(q(µ);µ). The meaning of (CTR)
is straightforward: the agency has to inspect farms with positive probability to enforce an
assignment level lower than the sel…sh one.
The preceding arguments establish that the government’s groundwater allocation problem






f¼(q(µ);µ) ¡ [s + (N ¡ 1)d]q(µ) ¡ c¹(µ)gp(µ) : (ASC),(EC),(CTR) (5)
where c¹ denotes the cost of an audit ¹ incurred by the agency. Before solving the program,
observe that since the audit is costly, the constraints (CTR) are binding at the optimum;
i.e.; the optimal solution involves K = t(µ)+¹(µ) ¹ F for all µ, which means that the expected
payment in case of evasion is the same for both type of farms. This implies a negative
relationship between the tax and the probability of control: The more a farm has to pay,
the less it is inspected. Since tax payment and groundwater allocations must be positively
related to satisfy (3) constraints, it then follows from this observation that the higher is the
farm’s allocation, the lower will be the optimal inspection probability for that farm type.
Characterizing the Optimal Extraction Policy with No
Redistributional Concerns
In solving program (5), it is analytically convenient to adopt a two-step solution procedure
suggested originally by Weymark and later developed more fully by Chambers and Bourgeon
and Chambers. The solution strategy is to …rst solve the adverse selection and evasion
problems given a particular groundwater assignment q(£) and then to pick the optimal
groundwater assignment. Let us consider the case of an interior solution for ¹ …rst. With



















7C(q(£)) can be interpreted as the cost of the adverse-selection and evasion problem
for a given groundwater resource assignments q(£). Since I assume that there is no social
gain associated to the amount of tax collected, the cost of the policy comes solely from the
inspection e¤ort that the regulation of the groundwater extraction necessitates. Using the
fact that t = ¼ ¡U, a decrease of U(µ) for the µ-type farm corresponds to an increase of its
tax payment, which from binding (CTR) allows to monitor less intensively this farm. Still
from binding (CTR), a decrease in the expected evasion payment K allows the agency to
reduce inspection e¤ort on all farms.
Figure 1 illustrates problem (7) for a given K in gross pro…t level (U(£)) space. The
straight lines parallel to the bisector (the 450 degree line emanating from the origin) cor-
respond to the binding incentive constraints (ASC). The incentive-compatible pro…t pairs
are thus located between these two lines. The horizontal line with intercept ¼¤(¹ µ) ¡ K cor-
responds to the evasion constraint (EC), and the relevant pro…t values are located above
this line. Finally, the lines with intercepts C ¡K and C¤ ¡K with the same negative slope
correspond to the agency’s iso-cost lines. Cost is decreasing downward as indicated. Observe
that the incentive area delimited by the (ASC) lines does not depend on K, whereas iso-cost
lines and the evasion line (EC) do. Consequently, for any q(£), there are three possible
situations depending on the value of K. We either have
¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K ￿ ¢(q(µ))
which corresponds to an intercept of the (EC) line located below the intercepts of the (ASC)
lines (e.g.; at point D), or
¢(q(¹ µ)) < ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K < ¢(q(µ))
which corresponds pictorially to an intercept of the (EC) line located between the intercepts
of the two (ASC) lines (e.g.; at point B), and …nally
¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K ¸ ¢(q(¹ µ))
which is the case depicted. These cases correspond to decreasing values of K, and given (7),
we intuitively infer that the later situation of a “small” K is the optimal one. This intuition
8is easily veri…ed. Consider that the …rst case is the optimal situation, i.e.; that the optimal
solution is such that
¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K ￿ ¢(q(µ))
The optimal point is at the intercept of the ¹ µ-type incentive constraint (ASC), which
gives








fNK + p(¹ µ)¢(q(µ))g
Minimizing with respect to K increases the intercept of the (EC) line which would eventu-
ally be higher than the intercept of the ¹ µ-type (ASC) line since ¼¤(¹ µ) > ¢(q(µ)), hence a
contradiction. Same reasoning applies in the second case, i.e.;
¢(q(¹ µ)) < ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K < ¢(q(µ))
In that case, the optimal point solution is at B, which gives
U(¹ µ) = ¼








fp(µ)K + p(¹ µ)¼
¤(¹ µ)g
Again, minimizing the right hand side with respect to K increases the intercept of the
(EC) line which would eventually be higher than the intercept of the µ-type (ASC) line since
¼¤(¹ µ) ¸ ¼(q(¹ µ);¹ µ), hence a contradiction.
We thus must have
K < ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ ¢(q(¹ µ)) (8)
9at the optimum of the program, which is the situation depicted Fig. 1. The optimal point
solution is thus at point A which yields a cost equal to C¤. The optimal solution is located
where the µ-type incentive constraint (ASC) and the evasion constraint (EC) intersect. In-
deed, we then have
U(¹ µ) = ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K (9)






¤(¹ µ) ¡ p(µ)¢(q(¹ µ))g: (10)
Observe that the constant K disappears from the expression of the cost. Consequently,
as long as (8) is satis…ed, optimal tax levels are de…ned up to a constant. Indeed, because
the regulator has no redistributive concerns, only marginal tax rates matter. However, the
condition (8) on K imposes that total tax payments t(¢) must be su¢ciently small to reduce
inspection e¤orts. Also notice that
dC(q(£))=dq(¹ µ) = ¡p(µ)¢
0(q(¹ µ))c= ¹ F < 0
so that under (1) an increase in the allocation to the ¹ µ-type of farmer reduces the cost
of implementing the groundwater assignment. The reason that this happens is clear from
Figure 1. The binding incentive constraint for the regulator is the one which makes it at
least weakly optimal for the less productive farmer not to mimic the extraction practices of
the more productive farmer. Hence, a marginal increase in q(¹ µ), which brings a relatively low
return to the low productivity farmer, makes the contract intended for the more productive
farmer even less attractive. As we shall see below, this leads to a ‘spreading’ e¤ect of the
type noticed by Chambers.
Substituting (10) in (6) and solving for q(¢) give the following …rst-order conditions for
an interior solution,
@q¼(^ q(¹ µ);¹ µ) =
s + (N ¡ 1)d
1 + c= ¹ F
¡
c= ¹ F




0(^ q(¹ µ)) (11)
10and
@q¼(^ q(µ);µ) =
s + (N ¡ 1)d
1 + c= ¹ F
(12)
and it is easy to show that
q
FB(µ) < ^ q(µ) < q
¤(µ)
q
FB(¹ µ) < ^ q(¹ µ)
and
^ q(µ) < ^ q(¹ µ)
Because the marginal tax rates de…ned by the right-hand sides of (11) and (12) are lower
than the Pigouvian tax, s + (N ¡ 1)d, the optimal groundwater allocation induces over-
extraction of groundwater as compared to the …rst best. Notice, however, that the marginal
tax presented to the ¹ µ-type farmer is lower than the marginal tax presented to the lower
productivity …rms. Thus, when compared with the …rst best, the more productive farmers
have a higher marginal incentive to over-extract than the less productive farmers. The last
result (no bunching at the optimum) is deduced from (1) and the fact that using (12) and
(11) we have
@q¼(^ q(¹ µ);¹ µ) < @q¼(^ q(µ);µ)
To understand the intuition behind these results recall that there are two incentive prob-
lems that the groundwater regulator is trying to address. One is the existence of information
asymmetries between the regulator and the extracting farmers, and the other is the existence
of a costly monitoring mechanism. Consider the latter problem …rst. Generally, it is not
optimal to monitor completely (set ¹(µ) = 1). Without complete monitoring, even if the
Pigouvian tax is charged, farmers will optimally depart from …rst-best extraction practices.
Thus, some over extraction, relative to the …rst best, emerges from the presence of costly
monitoring.
Now consider the former informational e¤ect. As we have seen above, C (q(£)) is de-
creasing in q(¹ µ) because raising q(¹ µ) makes it less attractive for the less productive farmer
11to mimic the extraction practices of the more e¢cient farmer. Put another way, there is
a reduction in the informational cost of implementing an extraction assignment if q(¹ µ) is
higher. Hence, because of the presence of the information asymmetries the more productive
farmer receives an extra incentive to over-extract groundwater when compared with the less
productive farmer. This additional over-extraction e¤ect depends on the extent of the di¤er-
ence between …rms types, their relative proportions and the monitoring cost. Rearranging
terms in (11) give
@q¼(^ q(¹ µ);¹ µ) =
p(¹ µ)
p(¹ µ) + N(c= ¹ F)
µ







and we have ^ q(¹ µ) < q¤(¹ µ) if
@q¼(q





[s + (N ¡ 1)d]
Consequently, a high monitoring cost compared to the maximal …ne, or a large number
of type-µ …rms, may induce the agency to give up reducing the resource extraction of the
type-¹ µ …rms to reduce monitoring costs.
As mentioned above, optimal tax payments are de…ned up to a constant. This is not the
case for inspection probabilities, which are completely determined by the resource allocation
pair ^ q(£). Indeed, using binding (CTR) constraints and (9), we obtain
¹(¹ µ) = [¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ ¼(^ q(¹ µ);¹ µ)]= ¹ F
¹(µ) = ¹(¹ µ) + [¼(^ q(¹ µ);µ) ¡ ¼(^ q(µ);µ)]= ¹ F
This is easily understood. Inspection probabilities must deter type-¹ µ producers from
evading the regulation. The agency has to design a regulation such that whatever type-¹ µ
farmers’ announcements, expected bene…ts in case of evasion are the same, and are lower
than their revenues when complying. Observe that even if producers do not comply with
their extraction assignments, they do have paid the tax payment corresponding to their
announcements. Consequently, if they have announced their true type, the tax payment do
not matter, and the inspection probability is deduced from the binding evasion constraint
(EC): ¼(^ q(¹ µ);¹ µ)¡t(¹ µ) = ¼¤(¹ µ)¡[t(¹ µ)+¹(¹ µ) ¹ F]: (Since the tax payment of type-¹ µ producers
appears on both sides of this equation, the agency inspection e¤ort is the same whatever the
12tax level.) If they have paid the type-µ tax amount, we must have t(µ)+¹(µ) ¹ F = t(¹ µ)+¹(¹ µ) ¹ F
to maintain the same expected payment in case of evasion. Since the same constant a¤ects
both tax payments, it cancels out, and the supplementary e¤ort of inspection on the less
e¢cient producers depends only on the di¤erence between tax levels.
The case where ¹(µ) = 1 at the optimum is straightforward. Because there is no possi-
bility to save on the monitoring costs of type-µ, arising from the information asymmetry, we
have
@q¼(^ q(µ);µ) = s + (N ¡ 1)d
and
@q¼(^ q(¹ µ);¹ µ) =
s + (N ¡ 1)d
1 + c= ¹ F
i.e.; only the type-¹ µ groundwater resource level is increased, and this distortion is limited to
the direct monitoring e¤ect.
It is worth to summarize the results obtained in this section. The cost minimization
stage allowed us to deduce that at the optimum, more productive farms are tempted to
evade from the regulation (they are indi¤erent at the optimum). Low productive producers
are not tempted to evade, but they are inclined to mimic more productive farms to increase
their resource extraction. From the second stage, we have obtained that the optimal resource
extraction levels are greater than Pigovian levels. This over-extraction allows the agency to
reduce its monitoring cost on all farms. For more productive producers, this over-extraction
e¤ect is exacerbated by the incentive of less productive farmers to choose the resource ex-
traction - tax payment pair designed for the more productive farmers. Over-extraction of the
more productive farmers allows the agency to increase the tax payment of the less productive
farmers, thus to decrease monitoring e¤orts on these farms.
Maintaining farm incomes
We observed previously that since the government has no redistributive concerns, the tax
schedule is only de…ned up to a constant. However, it is common for agricultural policy
13makers to have minimal income targets for their farm programs most obviously manifested
in the form of parity incomes. Suppose that the regulation of groundwater exploitation is
tempered by a farm-income goal. Because the reduction of the resource extraction diminishes
farms pro…ts, the optimal regulation characterized above may lead the agency to actually
subsidize farms (negative tax payments). This is the case when the marginal social damage
s is large and the number of farms N is important. The agency would follow these policy
requirements if they do not encounter a budget constraint. This is obviously not a reasonable
assumption, and in the following I will assume that the agency’s program is a¤ected by
terms re‡ecting the cost of public funds and the preference of the agency for tax revenues.
More precisely, taking into account the cost of raising funds to …nance public programs, the
agency’s objective is given by
X
µ2£
f¼(q(µ);µ) ¡ [s + (N ¡ 1)d]q(µ) ¡ (1 + ¸)c¹(µ) + ¸t(µ)gp(µ) (13)
where ¸ > 0 is the per monetary unit deadweight loss incurred by distortionary taxation
systems.5
Denote by ¹ R the minimum farm revenue that the government wants to guarantee. The
agency problem possesses an additional constraint
U(µi) ¡ dQ¡i ¸ ¹ R
for all µi, or
U(µ) ¸ ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)] (PI)
and
U(¹ µ) ¸ ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(¹ µ)]
Because the incentive constraints (ASC) imply U(¹ µ) ¸ U(µ) and q(¹ µ) ¸ q(µ), only
constraint (PI) is relevant at the optimum.





f(1 + ¸)(1 + c= ¹ F)¼(q(µ);µ) ¡ [s + (N ¡ 1)d]q(µ)gp(µ) ¡ ~ C(q(£)) (14)
14where
~ C(q(£)) ´ min
U(£);K
(







A strictly positive ¸ and the constraint (PI) change the optimal solution of program (15)
as depicted Fig. 2. Compared to Fig. 1, the constraint (PI) limits the available gross pro…t
pairs to the right of the vertical line going trough the x-axis at the point ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)].
With ¸ > 0, point A can no longer be the optimal solution. Indeed, we would have
~ C(q(£)) = min
K
¡¸NK + [(1 + ¸)c= ¹ F + ¸)][N¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ p(µ)¢(q(¹ µ))]:
Minimizing with respect to K decreases the intercept of the (EC) line, which can no
longer cross the (ASC) constraint of the type-µ farmers at point A, hence a contradiction.
This result re‡ects the fact that the agency places a positive weight on tax revenues, and
thus will arrange that incomes of (at least) the less productive farmers do not exceed the
minimal income requirement. Pictorially, this implies that the optimal solution is located on
the (PI) line between points B0 and D0. Consequently, three type of situations are possible
candidates for an optimum: Along the vertical segment between points B0 and D0, where
both incentive constraint (ASC) are lenient, at point B0, where the type-µ (ASC) is binding,
and …nally at point D0, where the type-¹ µ (ASC) is binding.
Before examining the di¤erent possibilities, it is convenient to de…ne
¹ ¸ ´
p(µ)c= ¹ F
p(¹ µ) ¡ p(µ)c= ¹ F
which is positive if p(¹ µ)=p(µ) > c= ¹ F and is a threshold level for the deadweight loss of public
funds. Indeed, for given extraction levels, the agency has to balance two e¤ects when de…ning
the tax payment of the type-¹ µ farmers. Since t = ¼ ¡ U, a decrease dU of their gross pro…t
allows the agency to raise an additional tax revenue dt = ¡dU per farm, inducing a social
gross bene…t equal to ¡¸p(¹ µ)dU. Moreover, with an increased tax payment, pretending to
be a type-¹ µ farmer is less attractive for type-µ producers. This allows the agency to monitor
less intensively type-¹ µ farms while satisfying their (CTR) constraint, leading to an additional
bene…t ¡(1 + ¸)p(¹ µ)c= ¹ FdU. However, to avoid tax evasion of type-¹ µ farmers, the agency
15will have to increase K, the expected payment in case of evasion, as indicated by (EC).
This involve to monitor more intensively all farms, as indicated by (CTR). This second
monitoring e¤ect annihilates the former one and induces an additional social cost on type-µ
producers equal to (1 + ¸)p(µ)c= ¹ FdU. As a result, adding $1 to the tax payment of the
type-¹ µ farmers induces a social net bene…t equal to
¸p(¹ µ) ¡ (1 + ¸)p(µ)c= ¹ F = [p(¹ µ) ¡ p(µ)c= ¹ F](¸ ¡ ¹ ¸)
Consequently, when the number of type-¹ µ farmers and the deadweight cost of public
funds are large (i.e.; p(¹ µ)=p(µ) > c= ¹ F and ¸ > ¹ ¸) the agency is induced to raise as much tax
revenue as possible on type-¹ µ farmers. Otherwise, the primary concern of the agency is to
reduce the monitoring cost of enforcing the groundwater allocation schedule.
We can now proceed to the examination of the possible optimal situations. Assume …rst
that the optimal point belongs to the vertical segment between points B0 and D0. At such a
point, the vertical (PI) line crosses the horizontal (EC) line and none of the (ASC) is binding
at the optimum. The optimal solution would be given by
U(µ) = ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)]
U(¹ µ) = ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K
whence
~ C(q(£)) = min
K
[p(¹ µ) ¡ p(µ)c= ¹ F](¹ ¸ ¡ ¸)K (16)
+[(1 + ¸)c= ¹ F + ¸]fp(¹ µ)¼
¤(¹ µ) + p(µ)( ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)])g:
Unless ¸ = ¹ ¸, minimizing with respect to K changes the intercept of the (EC) line, which
can no longer cross the (PI) line at the intended point, hence a contradiction. However, such
a situation is optimal when ¸ = ¹ ¸ (which implies that p(¹ µ)=p(µ) > c= ¹ F). In that case, the
agency is indi¤erent to the tax payment of the more productive farmers (tax payment of the
less productive farmers is deduced from the parity income constraint), since an increase of
their tax payment induces social costs due to monitoring of the less productive farmers that
o¤set marginal social bene…ts. Their tax payment is thus de…ned up to a constant depending
on K, the expected cost of evasion. However, since none of the (ASC) constraints is binding,
16we must have
¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)] + ¢(q(¹ µ)) > ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ K > ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)] + ¢(q(µ))
which, for given q(£), limits the range of available values for K.
Observe that (16) increases with the allocations of all farms. Indeed, an increase of
the resource extracted decreases the net bene…t from the resource of the less productive
farms due to the supplementary cost of extraction (equal to dp(¹ µ) for a marginal increase
of the more productive farms and d[p(µ) ¡ 1] for the less productive farms). This leads the
agency to decrease the type-µ tax payment to reach the parity income, and to monitor more
intensively the less productive farms to deter tax-evasion. For each $ lost by a type-µ farms,
the marginal social cost is thus equal to (1 + ¸)c= ¹ F + ¸.
Taking into account these e¤ects, the optimal extraction level ~ q(£) satis…es
@q¼(~ q(¹ µ);¹ µ) =
s + d[p(¹ µ) ¡ 1]




s + dp(¹ µ)
(1 + ¸)(1 + c= ¹ F)
+ d[p(µ) ¡ 1]
and are attainable only in the improbable case where ¸ = ¹ ¸.
When ¸ 6= ¹ ¸, it is easy to deduce from (16) which situation of the two remaining pos-
sibilities B0 and D0 is optimal. If p(¹ µ)=p(µ) < c= ¹ F (which implies ¹ ¸ < 0) or if ¹ ¸ > ¸, then
reducing K allows to decrease (16). The optimal solution is thus located point B0. At this
point, the horizontal (EC) line crosses the vertical (PI) line and the type-µ (ASC) line. We
thus have an additional equation that allows to determine the optimal value for K, given by
K
¤ = ¼
¤(¹ µ) ¡ ¹ R ¡ d[Q ¡ q(µ)] ¡ ¢(q(¹ µ))
The cost of a resource extraction pair q(£) is then given by
~ C(q(£)) = (1 + ¸)c= ¹ FN¼
¤(¹ µ) + ¸Nf ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)]g + (¸ ¡ ¹ ¸)[p(¹ µ) ¡ c= ¹ Fp(µ)]¢(q(¹ µ))
Observe that if the second term of ~ C(q(£)) is still increasing with the resource extracted,
the last term decreases with q(¹ µ). As explained above, when there is only a small number
17of more productive farms, or when the deadweight loss ¸ is low, the primary concern of the
agency is still to reduce the cost of auditing farms. This situation thus parallels the one
explained in the previous section where asymmetric information leads to an increase of the
resource extraction of the more productive farmers. Indeed, denoting by qB(£) the optimal
extraction schedule, we have
@q¼(q
B(¹ µ);¹ µ) ¡ @q¼(~ q(¹ µ);¹ µ) =
(¸ ¡ ¹ ¸)[p(¹ µ) ¡ c= ¹ Fp(µ)]







B(µ);µ) ¡ @q¼(~ q(µ);µ) =
(¸ ¡ ¹ ¸)[p(¹ µ) ¡ c= ¹ Fp(µ)]
(1 + ¸)(1 + c= ¹ F)
d[p(µ) ¡ 1]
< 0
Compared to the preceding case, we thus have over-extraction for all farms due to the
agency’s objective to reduce monitoring costs. As in the previous section, this over-extraction
e¤ect is exacerbated for the more productive farmers to reduce the incentive of the less
productive farmers to choose their extraction - tax payment pair.
When ¸ > ¹ ¸ > 0, increasing K allows to reduce (16). The optimal solution is thus




¤(¹ µ) ¡ ¹ R ¡ d[Q ¡ q(µ)] ¡ ¢(q(µ))
hence
~ C(q(£)) = (1 + ¸)c= ¹ FN¼
¤(¹ µ) + ¸Nf ¹ R + d[Q ¡ q(µ)]g
+(¸ ¡ ¹ ¸)[p(¹ µ) ¡ c= ¹ Fp(µ)]¢(q(µ));
The last term of ~ C is now increasing in q(µ). As above, this arises from informational
concerns. However, in that case, it is the incentive constraint (ASC) for the type-¹ µ farmers
that binds at the optimum. The more productive farmers are thus (weakly) induced to
mimic less productive farmers in order to receive compensation payments. A decrease of the
resource extraction of the less productive farmers q(µ) makes this mimicking less attractive
18by reducing the gross pro…t of the more productive farmers. More speci…cally, denoting by
qC(£) the optimal extraction schedule, it is easily shown that
@q¼(q
C(¹ µ);¹ µ) ¡ @q¼(~ q(¹ µ);¹ µ) =
(¸ ¡ ¹ ¸)[p(¹ µ) ¡ c= ¹ Fp(µ)]





B(µ);µ) ¡ @q¼(~ q(µ);µ) =
(¸ ¡ ¹ ¸)[p(¹ µ) ¡ c= ¹ Fp(µ)]
(1 + ¸)(1 + c= ¹ F)




Compared to the case ¸ = ¹ ¸, extraction is reduced for all farms. This e¤ect is exac-
erbated for the less productive farm. The primary goal of the agency is now to increase
tax revenues while maintaining the income of the less productive farmers to its minimum
level. The regulator, if he could, would capture the more productive farmers revenues above
the minimum income level. If the planner attempts to do so, however, he gives the more
productive farmers an incentive to mimic the behavior of the less productive farmers. The
incentive problem is now on the other foot. To deter this type of mimicking behavior, the
regulator optimally raises the cost to the more productive farmers of mimicking the less
productive farmers by adjusting the groundwater allocation intended for the less productive
farmers downward.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the optimal regulation of groundwater extraction under two assump-
tions not usually maintained in the literature on groundwater regulation: positive costs of
monitoring the rate of extraction and the presence of asymmetric information between the
regulator and the farmer on the use-value of the extracted groundwater. In such a situation,
the presence of costly monitoring prevents the regulator from using the Pigouvian solution
to achieve what is …rst best. It is shown that the presence of these twin problems thus leads
to over-extraction of the resource as compared to the …rst best. When there are no redis-
tributional concerns, the more productive type of farmer has a greater marginal incentive
19to extract than the less productive farmer. When there are redistributional concerns, the
primary objective of the agency depends on the cost of public funds. When this cost is low,
reducing monitoring cost is still the primary objective of the regulator, and we have over-
extraction compared to the second-best situation. When raising tax revenues is the primary
concern, this relationship is turned on its head, and farmers have lower marginal incentive
to extract.
20Notes
1Since ¼(0;µ) = 0 for all type µ, (1) implies ¢(q) > 0 for all stricly positive allocation q.
2Monitoring, if it occurs, is assumed to be perfectly informative.
3I assume commitment is possible on the part of the regulator.
4If f(q(µ);µ) were di¤erent from 0, we could replace t(¢) by the schedule ^ t(¢) ´ t(¢)+ ¹(¢)f(q(¢);¢) with a
…ne equal to 0 in case of compliance to obtain the same set of inequalities.
5¸ re‡ects the so-called “double dividend” of environmental taxation policies. The term 1 + ¸ a¤ecting
the agency’s cost is the per monetary unit “shadow cost” of public funds.
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Figure 2: Redistribution, incentives and enforcement costs.
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